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Abstract 
This paper studies regulatory convergence in the European electricity sector against a series of 
theoretically informed hypotheses. The paper is grounded in long-term empirical research in 17 
European countries (15 EU plus Norway and Switzerland).1 The paper concludes that 
convergence in the European electricity sector is observable both in terms of the overall 
conceptual framework of regulation, as well as in terms of regulatory institutions. Also, the 
European Union appears to be the driver of such convergence. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Dieser Text untersucht die Konvergenz der regulierung im europäischen Elektrizitätssektor auf 
dem Hintergrund von einer Reihe von theoriegestützten Hypothesen. Er basiert auf einer 
langfristigen empirischen Forschung in 17 europäischen Ländern (EU 15 plus Norwegen und die 
Schweiz). Der Text kommt zum Schluss, dass Konvergenz im europäischen Elektrizitätssektor 
beobachtet werden kann, und dies sowohl im Hinblick auf den generellen konzeptuellen 
Rahmen, als auch was die Regulierungsinstitutionen betrifft. Auch, scheint die europäische 
Kommission die Treibkraft dieser Konvergenz zu sein. 
 
Résumé 
Cet article étudie la convergence de régulation dans le secteur européen de l'électricité contre une 
série d'hypothèses théoriquement fondées. L’article se base sur une recherche empirique de 
longue haleine dans 17 pays européens (EU 15, plus la Norvège et la Suisse). Il conclut que la 
convergence dans le secteur européen de l'électricité est observable à la fois pour ce qui est du 
cadre conceptuel de la régulation et pour ce qui est des institutions de régulation. En outre, 
l'Union Européenne semble être le moteur principal de cette convergence.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1  This paper is a simplified and condensed version of a study to be published in a book on energy regulation, 
markets, and business strategies under the supervision of Prof. Atle Midttun. 
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Introduction 
 
In this paper, we will explore the hypothesis of regulatory convergence in the electricity 
sector. Basically, we want to assess whether a certain convergence of regulatory approaches 
(section 1) and institutions (section 2) can be observed in the 17 countries selected, and which 
factors (chapter 3) can explain this convergence today and in the near future. 
 
With Bennett (1992: 219) we consider convergence as a process of “becoming” rather than a 
condition of “being” more alike. In this perspective, we are not so much interested in assessing 
similarities but in identifying elements where dynamics toward greater similarities in the future 
can be expected in electricity regulatory frameworks. Respectively, we will try to track down 
diverging dynamics that might lead to greater differences across regulatory frameworks. Since 
this study is among the first of its kind and since a long time perspective is still lacking, these 
discussions are still largely exploratory. 
 
To start, let us sum up here the converging and diverging dynamics that we can observe in the 
electricity sector. Indeed, at least two converging dynamics can be identified when analyzing 
electricity regulation in the 17 countries. The first pertains to the post-liberalization regulatory 
frameworks, while the second refers to regulatory institutions.   
 
As we will show, there are three different models of liberalization in Europe, which largely 
influence the shape and content of the post-liberalized regulatory frameworks on substantial 
issues such as public services obligations (PSOs) and environmental measures. This observation 
tends to indicate that political and institutional variables represent important factors explaining 
differences among countries. These factors can in fact slow down or even prevent the emergence 
of convergence dynamics on the long term. However, one element of theses regulatory 
framework is widely shared and indicates the presence of a convergence driving force in spite of 
the importance of these models on the regulatory design. Indeed, the almost universal diffusion 
of the regulated Third Party Access model (except for Germany) is the most spectacular 
convergent feature, and as such allows to think that other elements of the regulatory frameworks 
might be the object of further convergence, as we will discuss below, even if rules, scope and 
scale of the regulatory frameworks do still widely differ.  
 
Quite surprisingly, it is on the institutional level that similarities and convergence can be 
observed in the electricity sector. The large domination of the “Independent regulatory authority” 
(IRA) model over the two others (respectively the “Politico-administrative” and the “Quasi-
judicial” models) can be considered as the illustration of a strong and coherent converging 
dynamic, at least for two reasons. Firstly because these independent regulatory authorities were 
especially created for the purpose of regulating the newly liberalized sector. As such, their design 
is therefore less subject to institutional and organizational path dependency pressures as it could 
be the case if they were the outcome of the transformation of an existing entity. Secondly, 
because all of them, with the exception of UK and Sweden, have been created in a short and 
congruent time period, between 1999 and 2000, and this similarity in time and context 
(transposition of the EU Directive), make it is easier to detect converging mechanism in their 
design process.  
 
 Let us look first at the empirical evidence highlighting such convergence in both the 
regulatory frameworks and the institutional arrangements. 
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1. Convergence in the regulatory frameworks 
 
“This Directive establishes common rules for the generation, transmission and distribution of 
electricity. It lays down the rules relating to the organization and functioning of the electricity 
sector, access to the market, the criteria and procedures applicable to calls for tender and the 
granting of authorizations and the operation of systems.” (Art. 1 Directive 96/92). Rather than 
the liberalization of 15 national electricity markets, the explicit goal of this Directive is the 
achievement of a common European electricity market as the contribution to the constitution of 
the wider Internal Market. The existence of this common goal does not mean however that each 
Member State endorse it fully and exclusively. Indeed, Member States usually use their statutory 
autonomy during the transposition process of EU Directives in their respective legal orders to 
adapt, interpret, precise or complete the general objective along the national political agenda. 
Although this process is closely scrutinized by the Commission, important discrepancies and 
variations in terms of goals, scale, scope and objects can be observed. The electricity sector is no 
exception as Table 1 shows. 
 
 
Table No.1: Goals of liberalization and regulation of the European electricity sector2 
 
Countries 
 
Goals of liberalization Goals of regulation 
England & Wales Introduce competition in the electricity 
sector 
Protect the interest of the consumers and 
promote competition (art 13 Utility act 
2000) 
Norway « lay the basis for an efficient electricity 
market »(Energy Act 1990) 
« control of network operations as a 
natural monopoly [...] ensure that 
electricity is transmitted at the right 
quality and price, and that the network is 
used and developed in a safe and rational 
way for society » (Energy Act 1990) 
Germany Delivery of secure, cheap and sustainable 
electricity and gas  
Anti-trust 
France - Secure the supply on the national 
territory and the general interest 
Switzerland Create the condition of an electricity 
markets  
Secure the national supply of electricity 
and fair prices. 
Portugal provide the framework for the exercise of 
the activities of electric energy 
production, transmission and distribution 
contribute to economic and social 
development and to the well-being of the 
population 
Netherlands Extend the possibilities for the generation, 
supply, import, and export of electricity 
Introduce new regulations relating to the 
production, transmission and supply of 
electricity, taking into consideration the 
importance of the reliable, sustainable 
and efficient supply of electricity 
Italy Liberalization of electricity production 
and trading 
Promotion of competition and efficiency 
while ensuring adequate service quality 
standards 
                                                 
2 In this table we have only considered the goals that were to be found in the national legislation. We have either 
reproduce citations of the English translation or reformulate the objective, which were sometimes implicit. In some 
countries, we were unable to get a English translation of the legislation (ex. Denmark). For other, the formulation of 
the legal text does not allow us to derive explicit goals (ex. Ireland). 
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Belgium None explicit  None explicit 
Spain N/a N/a 
Luxemburg None Prevent market power abuse and 
predatory behavior 
Enforce PSOs 
Ireland None explicit None explicit 
Greece N/a N/a 
Sweden Create competitive energy markets ensure competition within the electricity 
supply industry and create an 
ecologically sustainable and 
economically viable energy system 
Finland Ensure the preconditions for an efficiently 
functioning electricity market 
secure the sufficient supply of high-
standard electricity at reasonable prices 
Austria Creation of an electricity market along 
EU dispositions 
Provide cheap and quality electricity, 
increase the part of sustainable energy, 
ensure the provision of PSO (quality, 
security etc.) 
Denmark N/a N/a 
Sources: national legislations and official documents 
 
 
Apart from its rhetorical dimension such comparison gives a first, although superficial, 
indication of the economic and legal tradition, the political priorities, and the political 
compromises from which these reforms result. Three “models” of market and regulation design 
can be derived from this comparison. 
 
• The market oriented model is characterized by the explicit reference to competition 
creation and efficiency as the primary objectives of the reforms. Emphasis is put on the 
promotion of competition for the benefit of customers in terms of price and quality. 
Although redistributive goals and public services objectives (PSO) are not forgotten, they 
constitute corrective mechanisms and as such are only secondary objectives. Regulation 
in this model is largely designed to create and then maintain competition in the sector in 
the interest of the consumer mainly through anti-trust and/or sector specific regulatory 
intervention. This model can be found in England & Wales, and to some extent in 
Germany and Luxemburg. 
 
• At the other extreme of the spectrum, the public service oriented model emphasizes the 
importance of electricity as a vital commodity that requires specific protections and 
safeguards in a competitive market. Generally, the concepts of “competition” or “market” 
are not used, and if they are used only on exceptional occasions. On the contrary, PSO 
are very often defined and described in detail and referred to as the main goal of the 
regulatory reform designed for the citizen, not the consumer, as it is the case in France, 
Portugal and Spain. 
 
• In between these two ideal-types, the mixed model is definitely the most popular in 
European countries, although the differences between countries can be sometimes 
substantial. However, what characterizes these countries is the explicit combination or 
tension between liberal measures like the creation of an efficient market and the 
willingness to implement large scale redistributive and PSO objectives. Very often, both 
liberalization and regulation design seek to create the condition for an efficient market 
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taking into account the public interests. Theses interests can rank from ensuring the 
security of supply to implementing environmental measures.  
 
Apart from these general objectives pertaining to market creation, regulatory reforms can vary 
as to their degree of comprehensiveness. As we saw above, market oriented models, for instance, 
put a smaller emphasis on environmental issues or PSO as do the public services or the mixed 
models. Therefore, when comparing regulatory frameworks it is interesting to observe how each 
country used its statutory freedom in the transposition of an EU Directive to adapt or complete it 
along its own national agenda and priorities. Table 2 compares countries on four issues. First, the 
institutional issue: are electricity and gas regulation integrated? In other words, is there one 
sectoral regulator for each sector or only one taking on both tasks? Secondly, the issue of the 
object of regulation: what is regulated? What and how many aspects of the policy domain 
(electricity) are the object of the regulatory process? Apart from the supervision of third party 
access (TPA), regulation can extend to investments decisions of operators, public service 
objectives (price, quality, universality) and environmental issues. Each of these four dimensions 
is ranked from highly regulated to no regulation. This evaluation is based on the appreciation of 
the precision of the objectives (general goals vs detailed and measurable outputs and outcomes), 
the type of regulatory instrument (hierarchic vs incentives), and the nature of the control and 
monitoring instruments (voluntary vs compulsory and recommendation vs sanctions ). 
 
 
Table 2 Scale and Scope of the regulatory process 
 
Scope of regulatory intervention Countries Integrated 
sectoral 
regulator 
(electricity 
and gas) 
TPA3 
 
Public service 
obligations 
Environmental 
measures 
England & 
Wales 
Yes 
(OFGEM) 
rTPA Obligation to connect, 
standards of service 
performance, 
customers complaint 
Standard of 
performance on efficient 
use of electricity 
Norway ? rTPA ? Gov. rights in hydro 
Germany No nTPA* Obligation to connect Obligation to purchase 
renewable sources for 
grid operators 
France No rTPA Obligation to connect 
and supply, 
Social tariffs, 
Fund for PSO 
No 
Switzerlan
d 
No rTPA Obligation to connect Public lawns for 
stranded costs 
Portugal Yes rTPA* Obligation to connect 
and supply, 
Code of conducts and 
practice 
Obligation to buy from 
renewable at 
governmental set prices 
Netherland
s 
Yes (Dte) rTPA Maximum prices for 
captive customers 
Obligation to purchase 
green electricity, 
Green certificate 
                                                 
3 This mainly includes grid management, prices and quality. 
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Italy Yes 
(Autorità) 
rTPA* Obligation to connect 
Social tariffs 
Priority to renewables 
Renewable production 
quotas 
Levy on tariffs for 
stranded costs 
Belgium Yes (CREG) rTPA Price caps for captive 
customers, 
Fund for stranded costs 
Spain Yes (CNE) rTPA Obligation to connect Renewable support 
Luxembur
g 
Yes (ILR)4 rTPA Obligation to connect 
Equality in captive 
customers tariffs 
Compensation fund for 
PSO 
Priority to renewable 
Ireland No rTPA N/a N/a 
Greece No rTPA N/a N/a 
Sweden ? rTPA Obligation to connect ? 
Finland Yes (EMA) rTPA Obligation to connect ? 
Austria No rTPA Obligation to connect 
and supply 
Priority dispatching 
from renewable 
Stranded costs 
Denmark Yes rTPA N/a N/a 
* These three countries also implement the single-buyer model on the local level. 
  
 
This table inspires the following comments on each of the four aspects considered: 
 
• Although conducted as two different reforms, the electricity and the gas liberalizations 
are part of the general plan to create a Single European Energy market. Half of the 
countries considered in the study have translated this policy into their institutional 
frameworks and created integrated gas and electricity regulatory authorities, while 
others are planning do to accordingly when the gas market will be open to competition 
(ex. France). Several factors can explain this general tendency to consider energy 
regulation as a cross-sectoral task. First, it constitutes an acknowledgment of the 
considerable amount of synergies and that can be found between these two sectors in 
terms of markets and business strategies. Secondly, although different in technical 
terms, the liberalization patterns of these two sectors are quite similar (access mode, 
unbundling, etc.). Therefore, governments have considered, thirdly, that in 
institutional terms the setup of two separate regulatory frameworks would have been 
too costly and inefficient. One case is however outstanding: Luxembourg. In this 
country, the regulatory authority covers the entire spectrum of network industries: the 
same institution is in charge of regulating the telecommunications, gas, electricity, 
postal radio communication sectors. The Luxemburg government transformed in 2000 
this former telecommunication regulator into multi-sectoral authority with the purpose 
of maximizing synergies and minimizing institutional redundancy and regulatory costs 
for such a small country. 
 
• The most striking feature of this comparison is definitely the almost universal 
diffusion of the regulated Third Party Access model, although behind this quasi-
                                                 
4 This authority is responsible for the regulation of postal services, electricity, gas and telecommunications 
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unanimity, very different patterns and diverging implementations can be found in 
terms of regulatory process and tariffs supervision or approval. Germany is the only 
country that opted for the negotiated Third Party Model. As Eberlein (2001) shows, at 
least three reasons explain this German exception: the federal political structure of the 
country, the corporatist style of state-society relations, and the social market ideology 
that inspired many German institutions and policies. With this exception, the 
dominance of rTPA model all over Europe is unique. Various considerations could 
explain this. First, it is the logical model of market regulation, congruent with the 
economic doctrine of state intervention in case of market failure and natural monopoly 
elements. Secondly, it gives the state the opportunity to continue to have a word to say 
in the management and regulation of a sector where market imperatives and public 
interest have to be balanced. Finally, it is generally considered to be the most efficient 
model to promote competition in network industries. 
 
• Although the concept of “universal services” is not used in this sector, public service 
obligations, as they are described by the Directive and as they are transposed and 
implemented in member states, are very close to what can be found in 
telecommunications and postal sectors. As table 2 demonstrates, access, translated into 
the “obligation to connect” is the core element or the minimal standard of PSOs. 
Differences in terms of scope and scale do only partially depend on the category of 
market and regulation design model. It appears like the difference is not in terms of 
the nature of the PSO, but in terms of the perspective from which they are considered: 
from the citizen or the consumer point of view. If market oriented countries focus the 
scale and scope of PSOs on this core element, quality of service considerations are not 
left aside and are generally dealt with consumer protection measures, for instance like 
in England & Wales where consumer are associated in the regulation of the sector 
through the institutionalization of complaints or through the setting by the regulator of 
quality standards imposed on operators. On the other side of the spectrum, public 
service oriented countries generally include social measures (social tariffs) and set up 
complex financial or regulatory mechanisms like funds to finance PSOs. This is the 
case of France and to some extent of Portugal, where a distinction is made between the 
competitive electricity market and the public electricity system. In between, the mixed 
model countries combine customer oriented dispositions (code of conducts) and public 
services measures (price caps for captive customers). 
 
• The situation is identical with the environmental issues. A core element of 
environmental measures can be found around two dispositions, i.e., measures 
encouraging renewable energies (obligation to buy, price guarantee, standards, 
certification) and stranded cost recovery through levies, taxes, or loans. If the second 
set of measures are transitional and aim at adapting the industry to the competitive 
environment, the first ones are designed to adjust energy policy instruments to the new 
context of competition. This adjustment process is rather limited and marginal 
considering the importance of energy policy issues, such as environmental protection, 
rational use of energy, and security of supply. It is as if governments did consider that 
liberalization and energy policies were not really linked together, both on the 
institutional and the substantial levels. 
 
In short, a common model of regulation is slowly but clearly emerging, taking the form of an 
integrated electricity and gas regulatory framework resting upon the regulated Third Party 
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Access model. The picture is more uneven on the substantial level. Although, a “universal” core 
definition of PSOs does exist, differences can still be important between on one hand countries 
focusing on consumer protection and on the other countries inspired by a more citizen oriented 
conception of public services. 
 
 
2. Convergence in institutional arrangements 
 
Regulation is a multi actor process. In its wider sense regulation is the meta-process including 
all the actors (governments, operators, regulatory authorities, customers, political parties, 
associations etc.) that act in one way or another within the sector. In its strictest sense, it 
encompasses the relations between political authorities (government), the regulatory authorities, 
appeal institutions, and the industry, although in some cases, consumer and interests groups can 
also be included in the process. These actors form institutional arrangements determined by 
statutory attributions (e.g., relations between the regulatory authority and the sponsoring 
ministry) and formalized in the law, by reputational or resource based power distribution, and by 
informal relations. Table No.3 summarizes theses arrangements in each country by considering 
three dimensions. The first pertains to the relationship between the regulatory institution and the 
governmental authorities and identifies the legal and organizational nature of the regulatory 
institution (independent, administrative or judicial). The second pertains to the relation between 
sectoral regulatory institutions and the competition authority. Finally, the role of courts and/or 
dispute settlement institutions gives an indication about the way disputes are resolved and about 
the degree of judicial intervention in the regulatory process. 
 
 
Table No.3: Models of regulatory institutions in the electricity sector 
 
Model* General features Countries 
 
Politico-
administrative 
 
• Concentration of regulatory functions in political 
hands  
• Existing independent regulatory institutions can act 
as consultative or advisory bodies 
• Competition regulation as a complement to sectoral 
regulation 
• Courts and judicial systems as appeal authority 
 
Norway, Switzerland, 
Spain, Luxemburg, 
Netherlands 
 
Quasi-judicial 
 
• Generally weak resources 
• Generally weak regulatory powers 
• Important role of ministries as coordinators and 
appeal authorities 
• Mainly ex-post regulatory intervention 
• Weak or no ex-ante regulatory intervention 
• Competition regulation is the sectoral regulation 
• Sectoral regulation is part of a judicial process 
 
Germany 
 
 
Independent 
regulatory 
authority 
 
• Wide range of attributions to the independent 
authority 
• Combination of ex-ante and ex-post regulatory 
intervention 
• The regulatory authority generally takes decisions on 
its own 
• Coordination with competition authority 
England & Wales 
France 
Italy 
Portugal 
Belgium 
Ireland 
Greece 
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• Ministries as appeal authority (1st order) 
• Courts and judicial systems as appeal authority (2nd 
order) 
Sweden 
Finland 
Austria  
Denmark 
*We considered the dominant regulatory actor, i.e., the actor responsible for the core regulatory functions (TPA and 
network access management). 
 
• In the politico-administrative model, sectoral regulation is integrated in the governmental 
and political process. If an independent regulatory body exists, as is the case in Spain, 
this institution acts as an advisory body for the sponsoring ministry which monopolizes 
most of the regulatory functions. In this model, the general competition regulation 
represent the second pillar of the sectoral regulation framework, if it is not the sole 
regulator, like in the Netherlands, where the sectoral regulation of electricity is 
responsible for a division of the competition authority. The situation in the Netherlands is 
however unique, as the Ministry can give binding instructions to the competition 
authorities. This explains why this case is not placed in the second model.  
 
• It is difficult to speak of model since Germany is the sole example illustrating a quasi-
judicial regulatory authority. However, in many ways, this framework can be considered 
as an alternative to the dominant independent regulatory authority model. At least, this 
how the advocates of this model (i.e., the German government) see it. It is generally 
considered that this model is more market-oriented than other models, as it relies on the 
dynamics of the markets on a self-regulatory and on a competition regulation basis. 
Operators and actors of the market act “in the shadow of government intervention” 
(Eberlein 2001:383), and regulatory intervention is only required to settle disputes or to 
prevent market power abuse. Regulation is therefore ex-post, and competition regulation 
is an adequate substitute to costly and inefficient sectoral regulation.  
 
• The third and dominant independent regulatory authority model can be considered as a 
combination of the first two others or as a mid-spectrum solution. The rationale for the 
delegation of regulatory powers to independent regulatory authorities (IRA) are 
numerous5: credible commitment, political uncertainty, expertise, flexibility to which we 
should had the reduction of regulatory inconsistency and discrimination when 
governments are at the same time owner of operators and regulator. Generally, to be 
qualified as an IRA, the authority has to meet at least three requirements (Thatcher 2002: 
103): it has its own powers and responsibilities under public law; it is organizationally 
separated from ministries and it be neither elected nor managed by elected officials. Their 
attributions can widely vary, but generally comprise ex ante and ex post powers as table 4 
shows. 
 
Regulatory authorities can differ in terms of nature as we saw in the previous section. We 
compare now these sectoral regulatory authorities in terms of missions, competencies, powers, 
political autonomy and resources, as is summarized in the following table.  
 
 
                                                 
5 See Vol 8, Issue 1, Spring 2002 of the Swiss political Science Review for a discussion on the main theoretical 
arguments for the creation of IRAs. 
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Table No.4 Sectoral regulatory authorities* 
 
Sectoral 
regulator 
Name Missions Competencies 
in electricity 
Regulation 
Powers Political 
autonomy 
Resources 
(2001) 
England 
& Wales 
Office of Gas 
and 
Electricity 
Markets 
(OFGEM) 
Promote 
competition 
and consumer 
protection 
Price control, 
Licensing, 
Network access 
enforcement, 
Quality 
standards 
setting, Dispute 
settlement 
Inquiries, 
Financial 
penalties, 
legal 
enforcement 
Licensing 
decision by 
DTI 
Board: 1 +(10) 
Staff: ~ 300 
Budget: 35 M £ 
coming from 
licensee fees 
Norway Norwegian 
Water 
resources and 
Energy 
Administratio
n (NVA) 
Administering 
water and 
energy 
resources 
Licensing, 
Network access 
regulation, 
Market 
monitoring 
Legal 
enforcement 
(licenses); 
recommandat
ions 
All decisions 
can be 
revised by 
Ministry 
(MPE) 
N/a 
Germany Office of 
Cartels 
(Bundeskartel
lamt) 
Enforce Cartel 
law 
Dispute 
settlement and 
abuse of 
dominant 
power 
Legal 
enforcement 
Anti-trust 
law 
Board: - 
Staff: 5-6 
Budget: ? 
France Commission 
de regulation 
de 
l’électricité 
(CRE) 
Regulate 
network access 
Access tariffs 
review, dispute 
settlement, 
advice to 
Minister, grid 
management 
supervision 
Legal 
enforcement, 
financial 
penalties 
Access tariffs 
are set by the 
Ministry  
Board: 6 
Staff: 80 
Budget: 60MFF 
from public 
budget 
Switzerla
nd 
Office of 
Energy 
(OFEN) 
 Licensing, 
Benchmarking, 
Policy Advice, 
Codes setting 
Inquiries, 
Sanctions 
None. 
Disputes are 
dealt by a 
special 
independent 
commission 
Board: - 
Staff: ? 
Budget: ? from 
public budget 
Portugal Energy 
Regulatory 
Authority 
(ERSE) 
Regulation of 
electricity and 
gas sector 
Transmission 
and distribution 
tariffs 
regulation 
Secondary 
legislative 
power 
(Codes of 
conduct), 
Inquiries, 
financial 
penalties, 
legal 
enforcement 
Decisions 
from ERSE 
can only be 
appealed 
before Courts 
Board:3 
Staff: 42 
Budget: 4.5M 
Euros from 
“use of system” 
tariffs 
Netherlan
ds 
Dienst 
Toezicht en 
Uitvoering 
Energie 
(DTE) 
Regulation of 
network access 
Policy advice 
(licenses), 
System tariffs 
approval, 
Codes setting, 
Grid 
management 
regulation 
Inquiries, 
Sanctions 
DTE can 
receive 
binding 
instructions 
from 
Ministry 
Board:1 
Staff: 33 
Budget: 4 m € 
from operators 
contributions 
and state budget
Italy Autorità per 
l’energia 
electrica e il 
Promotion of 
competition 
and efficiency 
Price regulation 
(price-cap), 
Enforcing 
Inquiries, 
Hearings, 
Quality 
- Board: 3 
Staff: 63 
Budget: 18 m€ 
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gas (AEEG) and quality 
standards 
quality 
standards, 
Grids 
management 
regulation, 
Policy advice 
(ex. licensing), 
Dispute 
settlement. 
standards 
setting and 
enforcement, 
Financial 
sanctions 
from levy on 
operators 
Belgium Commission 
de regulation 
de 
l’électricité et 
du gaz 
(CREG) 
- TPA 
regulation, 
Grid 
management 
regulation, 
PSO regulation,
Dispute 
settlement, 
Policy advice 
Inquiries, 
Financial 
sanctions 
CREG is 
responsible 
for the 
regulation of 
high tension 
grid, while 
regional reg. 
Take over 
regional 
grids. 
Board: 4 
Staff: 40 
Budget: 9.4 m€ 
from levy on 
network users 
Spain National 
Energy 
Commission 
(CNE) 
Regulation of 
Gas, Electricity 
and Petroleum 
Advice to 
ministry; 
Dispute 
settlement, 
approve M&A 
Monitoring, 
Expertise, 
Investigation 
No decisional 
power. 
Propose 
decisions to 
Ministry 
Board: 9 
Staff: 120 
Budget: 6.5 M$ 
coming from 
consumption 
tax 
Luxembu
rg 
Luxemburg 
Regulation 
Institute 
(ILR) 
Prevent market 
power abuse 
and predatory 
behavior 
Enforce PSOs 
TPA tariffs and 
conditions 
proposition to 
ministry, 
Dispute 
settlement, 
Administration 
of 
compensation 
fund, 
PSOs 
enforcement 
Inquiries, 
Sanctions 
Most 
regulatory 
functions in 
the hands of 
the Ministry 
(licensing, 
tariffs etc.) 
Board: ? 
Staff: 1? 
Budget: ?m€ 
coming from 
levy on 
regulated 
operators 
Ireland Commission 
for Electricity 
Regulation 
(CER) 
Promote 
competition 
and protect the 
interests of 
consumers 
Licensing 
Grids tariffs 
approval, 
Setting of 
performance 
standards 
Dispute 
settlement, 
Policy Advice 
Inquiries 
Sanctions 
CER can 
receive 
instruction on 
PSOs 
Board: 1 (4?) 
Staff: 27 
Budget: 5 m€ 
coming from 
levy on 
regulated 
operators 
Greece Regulatory 
Authority for 
Energy 
(RAE) 
N/a Tariffs 
proposition to 
ministry 
Monitoring of 
law 
Inquiries, 
Sanctions 
RAE is 
mainly a 
consultative 
body to 
ministry 
Board: 5 
Staff: 10 
Budget: 4.5m€ 
from energy 
taxes 
Sweden Office of Supervision of Licensing for Codes and Licensing Board: 1 
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Electricity 
and Gas 
Regulator 
(OEGR) 
natural 
monopoly 
elements 
network 
operations, 
supervision of 
network tariffs, 
Data collection,
Policy advice 
guidelines 
setting, 
Recommanda
tions 
decisions can 
be appealed 
to ministry 
Staff: 33 
Budget: 6.5 m€ 
from State 
budget 
Finland Energy 
market 
Authority 
(EMA) 
Monitoring of 
electricity 
markets 
Licensing, 
Retail prices 
monitoring, 
Grid 
management 
monitoring 
Investigation,
Data 
collection, 
Sanctions 
(licence 
withdrawal, 
financial 
penalties) 
Technical 
and 
economical 
regulations 
are fixed by 
the ministry.  
 
Board: ? 
Staff: 15 
Budget: 1.2 m€ 
from license 
fees and State 
budget 
Austria Electricity 
Control ltd. 
(ECGmbH + 
Electricity 
Control 
Commission 
(ECC) 
Monitor the 
liberalization of 
electricity 
Network tariffs 
approval, 
Dispute 
settlement, 
technical 
standard setting
Investigation, 
Data 
collection, 
binding 
decision, 
Financial 
sanctions 
ECGmbH is 
a private law 
organization 
working for 
the ECC; 
ECC is the 
judicial and 
decisional 
regulator 
ECGmbH 
Board: 1 
Staff: 43 
Budget: 7 m€ 
from levy on 
network user 
 
ECC  
Board: 3 
Staff: - 
Denmark Energy 
supervisory 
board (ESB) 
Monitor the 
liberalization of 
Energy markets
Tariffs 
supervision, 
Dispute 
settlement 
ESB acts on 
an ex-post 
basis 
Licensing by 
Ministry 
Board: 7 
Staff: 30 
Budget: 2.5 m€ 
from levy on 
consumption, 
production and 
transmission 
* When there is no formal sectoral regulator, we consider the actors which assume the sectoral regulatory functions 
(i.e., network access, technical, and prices regulation). 
Sources: European Commission reports, national legislations and regulatory authorities annual reports 
 
 
Although the competencies of regulatory agencies can vary a lot, it is possible to find core 
tasks that are shared by many. The supervision of network access tariffs and prices monitoring 
undoubtedly represent the core missions of regulatory authorities organized around the Third 
party access issue. Some authorities have extended competencies such as dispute settlement and 
even licensing attributions. 
 
The powers of these authorities are organized along a four circles model. At the center stand 
information, data collection and investigative powers which represent the basic powers of a 
regulatory authority whose tasks is to monitor the process and act as a consultative body. The 
second circle is organized around the settlement of dispute between actors of the regulatory 
system. The third circle is characterized by the ability for the authority to take binding decisions 
(for instance sanctions) on matters ranging from prices, grid management monitoring to penalty 
and license revoking. The most powerful regulatory authorities cumulate these three circles of 
competencies. However, some have extraordinary powers that add a fourth circle: quasi-
legislative powers. Some authorities have the ability to draw and adopt codes of conducts, which 
act as legal regulations imposed on the regulated industries. An authority that cumulates all four 
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regulatory power circles would in fact integrate judiciary (dispute settlement), executive (binding 
decisions) and legislative powers. 
 
The independence or autonomy of regulatory authorities varies also a lot. It is however 
interesting to note that even with powerful regulatory authorities (ex. UK) the role of the 
sponsoring ministry is still important. In such situations, the ministry is often the recourse 
authority, the final decision maker acting on the recommendation of the regulatory authority (ex. 
France), the legislator, or can give binding instructions on specific matters. The institutional 
arrangement between the governmental and the regulatory authorities and the question of 
independence that characterize it are undoubtedly one of the many crucial issues of the 
regulatory process, as we will see in section3.5 below. 
 
Two interesting observations can be formulated on resources. First, all regulatory authorities 
consider that in the next years their financial and staff resources should grow in order to act as 
fully functional regulatory bodies. Secondly, the nature of the financial resources varies a lot 
from one case to the other (public budget, levees, taxes). 
 
In short, we can observe regulatory convergence on the issues presented in the table below. 
 
 
Table 5: Elements of convergence in the electricity sector 
 
Element of convergence Objects of 
convergence 
Remaining 
divergence 
Potential for 
convergence 
Policy goals • Creation of Energy 
markets 
 
• 3 models (market 
oriented, public 
service and mixed) 
• Definition of 
Public services 
objectives 
• medium 
Policy instruments • Third party access 
modes (regulated)  
• Pricing methods 
• Grid management 
supervision 
• PSO supervision 
• high 
Policy institutions • Large diffusion of 
IRA model 
• Tendency to increase 
staff and budget 
• Mission, powers, 
autonomy 
• medium 
 
 
3. Factors explaining regulatory convergence 
 
Several theoretical arguments are currently available in the literature advocating policy or 
institutional convergence. In this section, we confront them with the above empirical 
observations and transpose them in the context of electricity sector regulation. We start by 
discussing the role of the EU as a convergence driver and follow with the evaluation of EU law 
as a convergence promoter. The third section looks at the EU policy process, while the fourth 
and fifth sections evaluate the role of informal institutions and national regulatory authorities as 
convergence agents. A sixth section look at external factors. 
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3.1. The role of EU as a convergence promoter  
 
With the exception of the two British and Norwegian precursors, all the others countries6 have 
liberalized their energy sectors under the initiative and the supervision of the European Union 
and more particularly the Commission. As both initiator and supervisor, the EU can be a 
powerful driver for convergence. In this section, we look at the formal powers of the EU (mainly 
the Commission) which affect the national regulatory frameworks. We focus on the formal 
attributions of the EU on each regulatory function. Considering four of the main regulatory 
functions, table 10 compares both national and EU powers for each regulatory function. 
 
 
Table 6 : Comparison of regulatory functions between EU and national levels 
 
Economic (1st order) regulation Political (2nd order) regulation 
 
COMPETITION REGULATION 
 
National level 
• Endogenous rule-making or 
European follower 
• Abuse of dominant position, 
mergers and acquisitions etc. 
• Usually does act on institutions and 
existing structures 
 
European level 
• Rule making (directives) and 
control of implementation and 
application 
• Harmonisation of national law 
• Subsidiarity principle 
• Mergers and Acquisition control 
• Cannot act on institutions and 
existing structures 
 
 
 
PUBLIC SERVICE REGULATION 
 
National level 
• Definition of content, financing 
mechanisms and implementation  
• Definition and implementation of 
national policies 
 
 
 
European level 
• Definition of “General economic 
interest” and “Universal” or “Public 
services” minimum standards. 
• Control of EU directives 
implementation (jurisprudence) 
 
 
SECTORAL REGULATION 
 
National level 
• Definition and implementation of 
TPA. 
 
 
European level 
• Definition of possible TPA 
conditions, methods and access 
pricing standards 
• Possibility of legal recourse on 
access 
 
 
PUBLIC PROPERTY REGULATION 
 
National level 
• Through national, regional or local 
ownership 
• National rules on state aids 
 
European level 
• Rules on State aids 
 
                                                 
6 Including Switzerland, although indirecly. 
-- 14 -- 
 
Adapted from Genoud & Varone (2002: 239) 
 
 
Competition regulation is historically a strong component of EU regulatory intervention and 
constitutes an important part of its work dating back to the creation of the European Economic 
Community and the Treaty of Rome in 1957. It was from the beginning aimed at promoting 
effective competition and protecting consumers, but through time many other goals have been 
added such as the promotion of innovation and the monitoring of industrial restructuring 
processes (i.e. Mergers and Acquisitions) (Neven et al. 1998; McGowan & Cini 1999). Over the 
years, the EU competition policy and legal order have become the referent for many national 
competition policy reforms (Eyre & Lodge 2000) and has largely contributed to the 
harmonization and coordination of national dispositions in tune with the European framework. 
Competition regulation in the EU is a two-level process involving both national authorities and 
the Commission (DG Competition) mainly focused at the EU level on Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A) cases. If national authorities can generally act whenever they decide a violation of the 
national law has happened, the intervention of the Commission is limited to cases where M&A 
are foreseeable and or planned. Although in appearance limited, the EU competition regulation 
has become extremely active and powerful as we will see below. 
 
On the contrary, sectoral regulation is weakly developed at the EU level since it is limited to 
the definition of general rules and/or the regulatory instruments that member States can choose 
from (ex. regulated, negotiated TPA etc.) and to the legal recourse against an improper 
implementation of EU rules at the national level. In fact, the Commission has no direct formal 
powers in sectoral regulation. Most sectoral regulatory issues are dealt with at the national level 
where the rule makers design the regulatory framework pertaining to the sectoral regulatory 
function (regulatory institutions, instruments etc.). The Commission acts mainly as a recourse 
authority. 
 
The concept of “public services” has progressively gained importance at the European level 
over the years. Divergent national traditions pertaining to public services objectives (PSOs) have 
often constituted obstacles on the path to greater liberalization. If very often the definition of the 
content of PSOs, their financing mode and the organization of their production are the duty of 
national political authorities, the EU has progressively gained influence on these matters over the 
years, through the gradual and slow apparition in the EU legal order of concepts such as 
“General economic interests”, “universal” of “public” services. The emergence of this 
vocabulary was made necessary by the wide differences between definitions among countries 
that strategically used this fuzziness to oppose or wrongfully interpret the EU intervention and 
actions. Moreover, repeated decisions from the European Court of Justice on such matters have 
contributed to the constitution of a first definition of European PSOs. 
 
Contrary to what is often thought, the EU does not lead a crusade against public ownership. 
Public ownership regulation at the EU level is not an issue as such. Not only a public European 
ownership does not exist, but EU legal framework is almost “public ownership blind”. It is in 
fact exclusively through the rules on State aids (i.e. indirectly) that public ownership is 
“regulated” at the EU level. 
 
Several observations pertaining to convergence can be drawn from this short analysis.  
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• First of all, there is a difference of nature and degree in the EU regulatory intervention 
regarding 1st order and 2nd order regulation as identified in the table above. EU powers on 
economic regulation combine hard law making (directives), soft law making (White and 
Green Papers) and regulatory coercive powers mainly on competition regulation matters. 
While second order regulation exclusively rely on hard and soft law making and very 
little on regulatory coercive powers or indirectly through competition regulation. In fact, 
the European regulatory framework in electricity and gas regulation – and even more in 
other network industries such as telecommunications and airlines – is characterized by 
some sort of “cannibalization” of all regulatory functions by the competition regulation 
function. Competition regulation is the sole regulatory function at the EU level which is 
conceptually defined, legally legitimized and institutionally organized, while the other are 
weakly and poorly conceptually and institutionally organized at the EU level. 
Constitutionally deprived of direct powers and prerogatives on sectoral and public 
services regulation which are still member States privileges, the Commission is bound to 
act indirectly, through judicial review or legislation, if it wants to have a word to say on 
such issues. In fact, empirical evidence show that anti-trust and competition regulation 
have been used as an indirect mean at least to perform sectoral regulation aimed at 
increasing competition in the sector. This blurring of the ex post competition regulation 
and ex ante sectoral regulation (Pelkmans 2001: 447), although limited but nascent in the 
energy sector, is a reality. Since the opening of electricity markets in 1999, the 
Commission has numerously used the competition promotion argument or its 
prerogatives in M & As to set the conditions (divestiture, transmission and 
interconnection change of rules) under which a merger or an acquisition in the energy 
sector would be acceptable under the EU law as the VEBA/VIAG, RWE/VEW mergers 
and the EdF takeovers in Germany, Italy and Spain have shown. In other words, mergers 
control tends to become a quasi-regulatory function affecting now national regulatory 
prerogatives and other regulatory functions. 
 
• The consequence of this is that the EU regulatory framework is either mute on specific 
matters (public property regulation) or acts as it usually does in the process of liberalizing 
network industries: it first sets up a first minimal liberalization framework through a first 
directive, then controls its implementation through reports and soft laws, to finally 
redesign the framework in order to harmonize and create “governance or regulatory 
regimes” with the help of a second directive or amendments of the first. This three stage 
process is the second, although weaker and slower, instrument in the hands of the 
Commission to intervene beyond its natural prerogatives and to initiate a convergence 
and harmonization dynamics. 
 
• The existing EU regulatory regime of electricity – and gas by extension – can be 
qualified as “intergovernmental” (based on reciprocity and negotiated by governments), 
“narrow” (nothing on ownership, tariffs and planning), and “indecisive” (choice for 
countries for TPA model, pace etc.) as opposed to the “supranational” regulatory 
framework found for example in telecommunications (Levi-Faur 1999). The inability of 
the Commission to liberalize the energy sectors as it did in the telecommunications can 
be explained by various factors. For Schmidt (1998), the Commission was unable to 
liberalize the electricity sector through the use of its competition regulation powers (Art. 
90 and 90.3 of the former Treaty), as it did in telecommunications, for several reasons. 
First, the Commission did have very little support from the industry itself. Second, the 
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Council (Members States’ Ministers), and the European Parliament did not support, at the 
beginning, the prospect of liberalizing through competition regulation as opposed to the 
more traditional three stage strategy. Finally and consequently, in order to preserve its 
credibility, the Commission did not dare to overcome the Council of Ministers by starting 
to act alone. It however used its statutory powers (initiative, proposition) and its 
favorable informational asymmetry to propose various projects of liberalization 
directives, which gave greater maneuver to Member States, while not hindering its ability 
to act through competition regulation and the supervision and monitoring of the 
implementation of the electricity and gas directives. The final stage of indirect regulation 
process was launched in March 2001, when the Commission, after having threatened to 
use its statutory powers to give a new pace to the liberalization process through the use of 
the competition regulation path if members States refused to adopt new measures, 
presented its proposal for a reform of the electricity directive. This proposal for a new 
directive on electricity follows two goals: completion of the liberalization process and 
harmonization. In its various documents, the Commission justifies the second objective 
by the differences in the scope, pace of the liberalization and the institutional dispositions 
of the regulatory framework. Four main barriers to greater competition are identified: 
high network tariffs, high level of market power of existing generation companies, 
inadequate network tariffs structures and insufficient unbundling (Commission 2002: 2). 
It is thus clear that the intention of the Commission is to legislate a second time in order 
to achieve greater convergence in the completion of internal energy markets. What was 
not possible to achieve in the first Directive and what not possible to monitor through 
indirect means, the Commission tries to get through new regulations on the base of a 
benchmarking and evaluation process. 
 
• But the EU is not limited to regulatory intervention in the shape of legislation, 
monitoring, and competition regulation. Financial intervention in the shape of budgets 
allocated for specific projects, for instance to build new transmission capacity and 
infrastructures represent another form of intervention. This raises the question whether 
the degree to which the EU can act as a direct promoter of convergence depends or not on 
the existence of a formalized and institutionalized energy policy at the EU level. In other 
words the existence and the development of a common or European energy policy could 
play a significant role in the convergence of regulatory frameworks of members States. 
Energy is one of the pillars of the European construction: the European Coal and Steel 
Community and Euratom were designed to lay the foundation of a single or coordinated 
European energy policy. The creation of an internal energy market quickly became a 
secondary objective of the completion of the Single European Market. The dependence of 
a European Energy Policy on the creation of a corresponding internal market has largely 
determined the shape and content of this policy. This policy is founded today on four 
pillars (Matlary, 1996): price transparency, the development of energy infrastructures 
(Trans European Networks), tax policy and the European Energy Charter on investments. 
In this context, it possible to consider that the Commission will use the TEN program to 
build new cross-border transmission capacities to obtain competition and convergence 
objectives. In other words, the Commission as a “policy entrepreneur” might seek to use 
the energy policy as a levy toward the completion of internal markets and greater 
integration of markets and regulatory frameworks. 
 
To sum up, the Commission does represent a heavy driver toward greater convergence in both 
electricity and gas sectors, be it through the use of the competition regulation powers, of its 
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statutory power of initiative on new directives, and through a strategic use of the energy policy. 
But the real issue is whether the EU is condemned in electricity and gas sectors to focus its 
regulatory intervention on sole competition problems for structural (Commissions legal 
attributions) and political reasons (Member States’ reluctance to abandon regulatory powers on 
such vital sectors), or if it is able to shift its strategy of pursuing a negative integration of market 
creation to a positive integration based on the development of real public policies (Scharpf 
1999)? To answer this question, one needs to have closer look at the role of formal institutions 
such as the EU law and at the policy formulation process at the EU level. 
 
 
3.2. The role of the formal institutions: the European law  
 
The EU is a legal and administrative entity before being a political one. The legal order, 
treaties, directives, regulations, jurisprudence are the core elements of the European Union. This 
recognition of the law as a fundamental, if not as the only, driver of the European integration 
raises several questions pertaining to convergence. Law and especially European law is a 
regulatory process in itself, with its own objectives (integration of markets etc.), its rules (ex. 
subsidiarity, reciprocity) and its institutions (Commission, ECJ) which to an extent can be 
distinguished from the political process that adopted it, since it has a life and a dynamic of its 
own. In other words, European law can be analyzed as an independent and systemic object. The 
question is then: is the European legal system a driver of convergence in general and in network 
industries and energy sectors particularly and how? Behind this question, stand the issue of 
whether is a European legal order emerging above national legal systems, with its own dynamic? 
Although the answer to this question is not clear-cut, several empirical and theoretical 
observations tend to confirm the possibility of such a process. 
 
Undoubtedly, the liberalization of network industries in the last decade on the initiative of the 
EU has contributed to the constitution of nascent but coherent and solid regulatory regimes. 
Through the adoption of directives, their monitoring and the corrective or proactive actions of 
the Commission and the ECJ regarding their implementation, common rules and principles have 
progressively emerged at the EU and have in return affected national contexts. An illustration of 
this systemic effect of EU regulatory regimes can be found in the debates around the emergence 
of a “public service” doctrine in the EU. As Rodrigues has clearly shown (1999), the progressive 
construction of a “public service” doctrine, which is still nascent and unstable, is the outcome of 
a two stages systemic process. In the first stage, national PSOs traditions have been strategically 
used by members States either to promote or oppose the adoption of new dispositions toward 
greater competition. For instance, in the beginning, France opposed the liberalization of the 
energy sector advocating the performance of its “public service” system of public monopolist. 
Through political bargaining, a consensus could be achieved and the directive adopted, thus 
giving birth to a minimal, but existent “public service” concept in electricity at the EU level. The 
second stage is when this new legal order on “public services”, mainly through judicial actions of 
the Commission or of the ECJ giving content and substance to the concept, starts to affect in 
return the national legislations and traditions. Countries were the tradition of “public services” 
was highly developed (France, Spain, Italy) were forced to make concessions, while countries 
that never had an articulated equivalent concept suddenly incorporated in their legal framework a 
new principle. The outcome of this process is double. First, the conditions for the emergence and 
construction of a “public service” doctrine at the EU level appear to be met. Secondly and 
consequently, this emerging public service doctrine at the EU level might contribute as is has 
already begun to initiate a vivid convergence dynamic across countries and sectors. 
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3.3. Convergence through politics: the EU policy process 
 
Harmonization policies initiated by the Commission do not harm member states’ sovereignty 
as much as other strategies, like for instance the use of coercive powers through the recourse to 
the European Court of Justice on the mis-implementation of a directive. Coordinated 
harmonization maintains free movement and integrates national administrative and political 
national authorities into the process (Dehousse, 1997: 249). However, this form of “bargained” 
harmonization is often a sub-optimal solution for various reasons. It is a slow and cumbersome 
process and high risks of transposition bottlenecks and over-regulation remain (Dehousse 1997: 
250) as the discussion on the second electricity illustrates. The power game between the 
Commission seeking convergence and national governments trying to preserve their sovereignty 
and prerogatives on sensible national political issues is not new. It is a part of the equilibrium 
and the dynamics of European institutions. The presentation of the Commission project 
amending the first electricity directive in March 2001 has launched a new series of debates and 
political discussion between and within national governments. The French government is 
opposed to any changes before the German government does not deal with the remaining 
competition barriers on its electricity market. On the other hand, the German government 
accuses the French one to overprotect its national champion. In this context, the Commission is 
faced with a dilemma: cooperating and negotiating with member States in order to find a 
minimum consensus or act alone following the competition regulation route with the risk of 
losing political support and legitimacy. The risk with this situation is that in either case the 
process is risky, costly, hazardous, slow and incoherent and leads to “implementation gaps” 
(McGowan & Wallace 1996) or “regulatory gaps” (Dehousse 1997:251), which at first sight 
hinder the progress of market integration and harmonization, but which might play in favor of 
the Commission in the short term. There are several examples of “regulatory gaps” in the 
electricity sector that are the outcomes of the legislative compromise or of the diverging 
implementation and transposition of the directive in national frameworks due to the possibility 
for member states to choose its appropriate solution within the EU framework. The difference in 
the unbundling dispositions (legal, organizational or accounting) across countries constitutes a 
serious challenge for price transparency and regulatory intervention. Differences in access rules 
and competition mechanisms also represent competition and regulatory barriers. On the 
institutional level, differences in regulatory frameworks, such as the powers, missions or the 
main regulatory authorities and the remaining role of governmental and judicial authorities 
brings in more diversity and increases transactions costs for operators. Issues which are not 
within the scope of directive constitutes other “regulatory gaps” for instance like cross-border 
trade pricing. 
 
Aside from its legislative and its competition regulation powers, the Commission intervention 
includes the monitoring and implementation control of the EU legal order. The existence of 
differences in national regulatory framework, sometimes leading to incoherence, and the 
reluctance of member States not to cooperate in the harmonization process, push the Commission 
to find other ways by exploiting at the maximum its privileges and by developing informal 
institutions and process bypassing the formal decisional process to fill in these “regulatory gaps”. 
 
 
3.4. The role of informal institutions on convergence  
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The legislative option and the transfer of regulatory powers to supranational levels are slow, 
delicate and highly improbable processes that lead to the creation of “regulation gaps” harming 
the construction of a coherent internal market. An answer to this frequent situation in EU policies 
has been found in phenomenon described by political scientists as “Regulation by networks” or 
“Comitology” (Dehousse 1997) which have emerged over the years as pragmatic answers, 
sometimes initiated by the Commission, to the need toward harmonization and the empirical 
need for more integrated and coherent policies design and regulatory frameworks. This new form 
of “governance” based on expertise, partnership and information exchange is a response to many 
functional needs: to create a depoliticized arenas whose function is to deal with policy problems 
from a expertise point of view, to collect, analyze and organized information, experiences and 
know-how, to create forums where national experts or officials can share experiences, to build 
non-political consensus and solutions and to legitimize the action of the Commission etc. The 
form of these new governance entities can vary from the forum where experts and bureaucrats 
meet and discuss, to the building of “European agencies”, like the European Environment 
Agency (EEA) or the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA) 
whose tasks are to collect and organize data and act as consultative bodies. Although these 
“forums” and “European Agencies” are few – although they tend to multiply - and being denied 
regulatory powers by both national governments and to a lesser extent by the Commission, 
“regulation by information” is a powerful instrument to pursue harmonization or at least to 
initiate regulatory convergence.  
 
For instance, informal contacts between national regulators are being encouraged by the 
Commission as the existence of forums like the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER), 
the Madrid and Florence forums. The CEER created in March 2000, brings together 16 European 
energy regulators and act as both a cooperation platform between national regulatory authorities 
and as an advice body for the European Commission on energy regulatory issues. These same 
regulators also take a important part in the Florence and Madrid Forums which brings together 
since 1998, electricity and gas regulators, the European Commission, transmission system 
operators, electricity traders, consumers, network users and power exchanges. These two types of 
“informal” organizations work outside the direct control of national governmental authorities and 
have substantially contributed in the preparation of new European Directives for the European 
Commission. They also helped through the organization of discussion and the exchange of 
information and expertise to resolve practical regulatory problems such as cross border tariffs in 
a depoliticized context. These informal entities are also functional answers to the growing 
complexity of public policies formulation and regulatory task in electricity and gas sectors and 
encourage the search for ideal solutions outside the national context. These forums or 
information and expertise platforms represent the ideal infrastructure to initiate policy learning 
and emulation process, in which actors learn from experience and best practices. Coercion is not 
the sole driver for policy transfer, the perception of the necessity of a transfer and lesson-drawing 
are also powerful instruments (Dolowitz & March 2000: 13). By organizing these platforms, the 
Commission suggests best practices, models and original solutions (Radaelli 2000: 26), although 
indirectly since it is either the experts or the actors of the forums that build together the 
outcomes.  
 
This increasing use by the Commission of soft law and facilitating mechanisms based on 
information might indicate a profound shift from command and control public intervention 
toward regulation based on information and incentives as Majone foresaw it (1997:269) and 
could act as a powerful tool toward the achievement of harmonization policies. In these contexts 
characterized by uncertainty, complexity and the strategic value of information and expertise as 
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key policy resources, the Commission can develop various strategies and tools to purse its goal 
of internal market creation and regulatory convergence: the legislative option, the competition 
regulation route and the “regulation by information” path, which increase its powers, its 
credibility and add a new aspect to its attribution, i.e., the function of instigator. 
 
 
3.5 The role of regulatory authorities as convergence drivers  
 
The discussion has focused until now on the role of the EU and more precisely of the 
Commission as a convergence driver. But national regulatory authorities also play an important, 
if not crucial, part in the regulatory process. The large diffusion of the Independent Regulatory 
Authority (IRA) model is at the same time the illustration of a strong convergence and a 
powerful driver for further convergence. Indeed, their “independent” nature, as we will see 
below, puts them in a better position to import and learn from experience versus a politico-
administrative and quasi-judicial regulatory authorities embedded as they are in bureaucratic and 
legal constraints. 
 
The regulation process of network industries (i.e., mainly telecommunications, electricity, 
gas, railways, water and postal services) is a game in which multiple actors play: private and 
public operators, customers, governmental authorities, competition authorities, IRAs etc. In 
games, actors elaborate strategies, gather and consume resources, act and interact in the objective 
of attaining one or multiple goals. In this respect, IRAs are no exceptions. In charge of regulating 
a sector within the boundaries of the legal regulatory framework designed by governmental 
authorities, they have missions, objectives, financial, human and legal resources. One key issue 
of the regulatory process involving IRAs pertains to the relationship between IRAs and its or 
theirs sponsoring governmental authorities. How will these relations evolve through time in 
terms of power and positional centrality in the regulatory process? Will these IRAs strictly act 
within the formal legal framework set by the government or will they exceed or at least try to 
exceed their legal and constitutional attributions in order to become the dominant actor of the 
regulatory process on the expense of governmental authorities and ministries? And if yes, how 
will this happen and why?  
 
A power gain for an IRA can be the consequence of the success of a double strategy: the 
consolidation of their existing legal attributions (ex. policy advice) and/or the appropriation or 
the creation of new substantial de jure (ex. mergers and acquisition review) or de facto 
regulatory attributions (ex. dispute settlement). In other words, IRAs might try to use their 
resources and asymmetrical position versus their governmental principals in order to move up 
the scale of the regulatory powers from simple consultative body, through executive activity, to 
full scale legislative or quasi-legislative powers.  
 
Using a biological metaphor (Bernstein 1955, Philipps 1985:166-169), the life of an IRA can 
characterized by four periods of activity: gestation, youth, maturity and old age. The first two 
phases witnesses the constitution of a “crusading” commission seeking to draw popular support, 
to affirm its independence and to attract qualified staff in order to establish its legitimacy and its 
credibility. The two remaining phases are characterized by the IRA progressively becoming 
more conservative and progressively identifying with the object of its activity (regulated 
industries) and by ending up as being fully captured by the regulated. Largely metaphoric, this 
theoretical approach however find robust theoretical and empirical support in organization 
sociology approaches, for instance, from Crozier & Friedberg (1977). Strategic analysis focus on 
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the structural features of the power distribution within an organization and on the strategies of 
individual actors seeking to increase or maximize their influence by maintaining their 
“uncertainty zone” (i.e. their expertise and attributions). On a interorganizational level, we could 
therefore anticipate that as newly born organizations, regulatory authorities will seek, at least 
during their consolidation phase to impose themselves and to create their own zone of 
uncertainty (or regulatory space) by expanding their expertise, by flexing their muscles and by 
affirming their legitimacy, credibility and competence versus the public, the regulated industry 
and the government. The thirst of power, the need to increase its legitimacy and credibility and 
organizational dynamics would justify this willingness to gain power and importance. 
 
Contemporary policy analysis literature (Scharpf 1993, Marin & Mayntz 1994) focuses on 
resource variables as key variables for the determination of the spatial location and the power 
significance of an actor within a policy process or policy network. The actors or group of actors 
which possess one or the key resource(s) in a network is in the position of being a dominant 
actor. In policy and regulatory process, information and expertise, as we saw above, are key 
resources which largely affect the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of regulation. In this 
situation, regulatory institutions are institutionally put in a better position than governmental 
authorities for various reasons. Expertise is usually considered as one of the key factor justifying 
the creation of IRAs and as a necessary condition for a credible regulatory intervention due to the 
high level of complexity and technicality of the issues at stake. Responsiveness and flexibility 
(i.e., the ability to quickly adapt to the new challenges addressed by the environment by 
constantly fine-tuning the rules, the standards and the regulatory instruments) are also factors 
affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of the regulatory process. In both cases, IRAs are more 
adapted than governmental bodies in terms of resources, missions and procedures. As stated 
above, experience has shown that independent agencies have quickly become the main source of 
information, legitimacy and expertise for governments both in policy design and policy 
implementation phases (Dehousse, 1997). In sectors where technology and market mechanisms 
are dominant features as it is in the energy sectors, flexibility, responsiveness, credibility and 
professionalism are key elements for efficient and effective regulatory processes. Regulators are, 
again, both for institutional and organizational reasons better equipped than administrative or 
political authorities. Moreover, independent bodies are very often precisely designed to increase 
the credibility, the legitimacy and the efficiency of a specific policy process (Majone, 1997) 
characterized by uncertainty and a high degree of technical and scientific qualifications. In this 
context, regulatory authorities might try to reshape their institutional environment in order to 
constantly adapt themselves to the new challenges they are confronted to. As adaptability to the 
environment is a fundamental condition of maintaining its sphere of influence and power within 
a policy network, IRAs might try to take advantage of this structural advantage to strengthen 
their power and increase it. In other words, by looking at the context (rules, actors, issues) in 
which IRAs are embedded in, network analysis reveal the importance and significance of the 
constraints and the opportunities that the direct environment offer to an actor in order to achieve 
its goals. IRAs might be willing to use the context as a playing field and seek to maximize their 
structural and institutional position in the regulatory process, and use it as a resource to increase 
its powers, for instance, versus its sponsoring ministries.  
 
A good illustration of these dynamics can be found in the study of the French “Commission 
de Régulation de l’électricité” (CRE). In less than two years of activity, the CRE has adopted and 
elaborated a considerable amount of reports, position papers, communications and decisions. All 
of them clarifying, completing or implementing the existing legal framework. In this very short 
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period of time, the CRE has acted in ways that can be easily interpreted as first but superficial 
empirical confirmations of the postulates and hypothesis presented above. 
 
The approval by the CRE on 20 September 2001 of the rules regulating the electricity spot 
market organized by “Powernext” is the illustration of the use by the regulator of “regulatory gap 
or void” in order to create new rules and to grant itself new attributions within the existing legal 
framework. Although the ministry of the Industry did not oppose this approval, the final decision 
was heavily challenged by members of parliaments wondering about the legality of the CRE 
decision to create a spot market, since the law and the preliminary legal works clearly indicated, 
to their opinion, that this was not possible without the modification of the existing legal 
framework. In a short but dense communication (CRE 2001), the CRE justified its decision and 
its ability to accept and regulate a spot market in France. This example is a spectacular 
illustration of the legal interpretation power and the strategic and opportunistic move of an IRAs 
in a context characterized by regulatory voids or uncertainty which inevitably result from the 
delegation of implementation and quasi-legislative powers. With this decision, the CRE has 
created new rules and gained new regulatory powers, without governmental interference or 
parliamentary approval. It is, as a member of the CRE foresaw it, “according to the objectives 
and missions of its legal framework, the CRE has contributed to fill the gaps and silences of the 
present regulatory framework in order to ensure a continuity of the open market “7 (Tuot, 2001: 
54-55). 
 
Similarly, the CRE monitored in Autumn 2001 a first “virtual power plant” auction of 
6000MW from Electricité de France (EDF). This decision came from the European Commission 
in exchange of the approval of EDF joint control takeover of the German operator EnBW 
(Energie Baden-Württemberg AG). In this operation, the CRE clearly stated its willingness to 
make the French electricity market competitive even if it meant taking unpopular decisions 
against the public national champion. In doing so, the CRE explicitly wished to prove its 
independence from both the French government as owner of EDF, and EDF itself. It can also be 
interpreted as a positive and explicit sign to foreign competitors and investors who stand among 
the strongest supporters of the more liberal electricity market in France that the CRE advocates. 
 
This French example is significant in many ways for the discussion on convergence. First of 
all the CRE is a member of the CEER, and as such takes a part in this informal supranational 
regulatory structure where experiences are exchanged and empirical problems more and more 
dealt with. It therefore acts as an incubator of best practices and foreign experiences. Secondly, if 
convergence and harmonization are not a first priority of the CRE or any IRA, its quest for 
power and centrality in regulatory process could engage spillover effects and initiate 
convergence and harmonization, provided that this convergence results in power gains for the 
regulatory authority, by offering more legitimacy and credibility. Thirdly, IRAs, more than other 
kind of regulatory authorities, tend to be more easily compared to their foreign counterparts in 
terms of efficiency and effectiveness. This benchmarking could increase the pressure toward 
institutional isomorphism based on best practices evaluation. 
 
 
3.6. External factors of convergence 
                                                 
7 “au nom des objectifs et des missions que la directive et la loi lui fixent, que la CRE a entrepris dans plusieurs 
domaines de jeter des ponts au-delà des fossés, gorges et abîmes du droit positif pour s’efforcer de donner au 
marché ouvert une continuité” 
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The previous sections were exclusively concerned with factors for convergence that find their 
source in the inner dynamic of the regulatory process. In other words, the role of the 
Commission, of EU law, of informal institutions and regulatory authority in convergence are 
factors that are structurally rooted in the regulatory process itself. External factors that either 
affect the regulatory process in itself or the context in which regulation takes place might be the 
source of convergence dynamics.  
 
• Generally speaking, technology and technological progress are strong harmonization or 
convergence drivers. Although innovation in the electricity sector is not as powerful as in 
the telecommunication industry, technological progress in the production and transport of 
electricity can lead to profound changes in the industry. New efficient and low costs gas-
fired generators have already affected the industry structures of countries where gas was 
not a massive source of electricity production. The “dash for gas” that initiated this 
technological innovation has contributed for instance in the integration of electricity and 
gas regulation in the U.K. One must also mention here the new information and 
communication technologies which make unbundling, trading, and precise measurement 
and billing of energy even possible. 
 
• The dynamics of the markets might strongly affect the regulatory frameworks for several 
reasons. Firstly, instead of a pan-European Electricity Market we observe the coexistence 
of regional or even local markets delimited by technical boundaries due the different 
interconnections and capacities of cross-border networks. For instance, the UK and the 
Spanish peninsula constitute local markets, while there is an emerging continental market 
composed of Germany, France, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, next to a regional 
market integrating Norway, Sweden and Finland (Glachant, 2001). Therefore, an increase 
in the interconnection of these markets both in technological and commercial terms will 
affect the way the sector and the operators will be regulated. Secondly and consequently, 
market integration in the form of power exchange pools or specific markets will 
undoubtedly push toward a greater harmonization of the regulatory structure. 
 
• The fast emergence of Trans-National Corporations in the energy industry on the model 
of the water industry could also deeply affect national regulatory framework. Operators 
like E.on, RWE or even EDF growing in size both on home and foreign markets through 
M & A will push for harmonization of the playing field at least at the European scale. 
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
It is still too early to assess of even predict with certainty whether convergence will develop 
or not in the near future in energy sectors and what will be its content. However, it is possible to 
present solid hypothesis on what kind of convergence might be observable and what actors 
support or encourage it.  
 
At least three out of the five elements that compose policy convergence (Bennett 1991:218) 
(i.e. policy goals, policy content, policy instruments, policy outcomes, policy style), can be 
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expected to be the object of converging trajectories in the future in energy sectors: policy goals, 
and policy instruments. 
 
Although liberalization and regulation goals still differ among countries in terms of scope, 
scale and focus, as chapter 2 and 3 show, common regulatory objectives can be identified. The 
creation of effective gas and electricity markets is the core feature of liberalization and regulation 
in all the countries. With its willingness to deepen and accelerate liberalization the Commission 
contributes to reaffirm the rational for the reforms and confirm their strategic importance for 
European integration. Convergence on PSOs might be slower and less intense, due to the highly 
political dimension of the issue at national levels and the important divergence that still exists in 
national tradition. However, the slow emergence of a public service doctrine at the EU level can 
be considered as a powerful driver for convergence on minimal standards for the definition of 
European public services obligations. The convergence of energy policies is more uncertain. 
National traditions and institutional divergences constitute heavy obstacles. It is not however 
impossible that market dynamics, and especially markets integration, could affect the pertinence 
and effectiveness of existing energy policy instruments.  
 
This raises the issue of policy instruments. Under this category, we must distinguish two 
things: policy tools and the institutions that are supposed to use them. As for the tools to 
liberalize and especially to regulate energy sectors are already quite similar across countries and 
sectors. Competition regulation is conducted through M&A and through anti-trust tools. More 
precisely, the development of incentive remedies, like divestiture or sale of assets tend to replace 
more and more structural remedies. As in sectoral regulation the regulated third party access 
model is already almost universal. In environmental matters, certification, levee and taxes to 
encourage renewable energies are already widely used and new instruments might emerge 
together with the integration of markets. As for institutions and more precisely regulatory 
authorities it can be expected that although convergence is due to happen it will be on a slower 
pace and on a smaller case. Institutional dynamics and political inertia will certainly limit the 
degree to which regulatory authorities will become alike. However, it seems quite possible that 
regulatory pressure will not decrease, but more like be stable if not increase. 
 
As for policy content, policy styles and even more for policy outcomes they are too dependent 
on heavy structural and political factors too consider that they might be under the pressure of 
heavy convergence pressure.  
 
Three types of actors have appeared as credible convergence dynamics drivers: the EU 
Commission, the informal institutions at the EU level and the national regulatory authorities. The 
statutory powers of the Commission and its central situation in the EU energy regulatory regimes 
place it in a strategic position. Initiator and supervisor of the liberalization and re-regulation 
processes, the Commission can follow various strategies to achieve its goal of internal market 
creation and harmonization. If the legislative and the competition regulation paths remain at the 
center of its intervention, it has the opportunity to progress without the burden of political 
bargaining by relying on the many informal institutions that bring it expertise, legitimacy and 
credibility. These same informal institutions are expected to gain more power and centrality, 
especially as long as the legislative path is blocked at the EU level and act as heavy convergence 
drivers both at the EU and national levels. Finally, national regulatory authorities and especially 
independent regulatory authorities will most certainly amplify and accompany the convergence 
dynamics that originated at the supra-national level. 
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In short, our analysis throughout this paper indicates that convergence will be achieve less 
through the political path than trough a alternative technocratic and network shape like process 
integrating national and supranational levels in one emergent but coherent governance 
mechanisms. 
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